Intellectual Capital Architectures and Bilateral Learning: A Framework For Human Resource Management

Both researchers and managers are increasingly interested in how firms can pursue bilateral learning; that is, simultaneously exploring new knowledge domains while exploiting current ones (cf., March, 1991). To address this issue, this paper introduces a framework of intellectual capital architectures that combine unique configurations of human, social, and organizational capital. These architectures support bilateral learning by helping to create supplementary alignment between human and social capital as well as complementary alignment between people-embodied knowledge (human and social capital) and organization-embodied knowledge (organizational capital). In order to establish the context for bilateral learning, the framework also identifies unique sets of HR practices that may influence the combinations of human, social, and organizational capital

The Relic Abundance of Long-lived Heavy Colored Particles

Long-lived colored particles with masses m > 200 GeV are allowed by current accelerator searches, and are predicted by a number of scenarios for physics beyond the standard model. We argue that such "heavy partons'' effectively have a geometrical cross section (of order 10 mb) for annihilation at temperatures below the QCD deconfinement transition. The annihilation process involves the formation of an intermediate bound state of two heavy partons with large orbital angular momentum. The bound state subsequently decays by losing energy and angular momentum to photon or pion emission, followed by annihilation of the heavy partons. This decay occurs before nucleosynthesis for m < 10^{11} GeV for electrically charged partons and m < TeV for electrically neutral partons. This implies that heavy parton lifetimes as long as 10^{14} sec are allowed even for heavy partons with m ~ TeV decaying to photons or hadrons with significant branching fraction.Comment: 13 pages, 4 figures. Minor revision

CEO Power and Compensation in Financially Distressed Firms

We study the changes in CEO power and compensation that arise when firms go through financial distress. We use a matching estimator to identify suitable controls and estimate the causal effects of financial distress for a sample of U.S. public companies from 1992 to 2005. We document that, relative to those in control firms, the CEOs of distressed firms experience significant reductions in total compensation; the bulk of this reduction derives from the decline in value of new grants of stock options. These results hold not only for incumbent CEOs but also, surprisingly, for newly hired CEOs. Financial distress has important consequences on corporate governance, decreasing managerial influence over the board. We find that, among distressed firms, there is a significant decrease in the proportion of CEOs holding board chairmanship, and in the fractions of executives serving as directors or in the compensation committee of the board. We also show that periods of financial distress are associated with a decrease in opportunistic timing behavior of stock option awards. The results are suggestive of a link between managerial power and executive compensation.CEO compensation, financial distress, lucky grants, managerial influence, bias-corrected matching estimators

Not So Lucky Any More: CEO Compensation in Financially Distressed Firms

There is a debate on whether executive pay reflects rent extraction due to "managerial power" or is the result of arms-length bargaining in a principal-agent framework. In this paper we offer a test of the managerial power hypothesis by empirically examining the CEO compensation of U.S. public companies that were ever in financial distress between 1992 and 2005. Using a bias-corrected matching estimator that estimates the causal effects of financial distress, we find that, for the distressed firms, CEO turnover rates increase markedly and their CEOs, both incumbents and successors, experience significant reductions in total compensation. The bulk of the reduction in total compensation derives from the decline in value of stock option grants, which we argue is due to a change in the opportunistic timing of option grants. We define "lucky" grants as those with grant prices below or at the lowest stock price of the grant month, and we find that the proportion of lucky grants for financially distressed firms is higher before insolvency and lower upon and after insolvency, while the proportion for similar but solvent firms remains stable throughout the period. We interpret this evidence as consistent with a decrease in managerial power induced by a tightening in the "outrage" constraint due to the episode of financial distress.CEO compensation, CEO turnover, financial distress, lucky grants, bias-corrected matching estimators

Micromechanical model of crack growth in fiber reinforced ceramics

A model based on the micromechanical mechanism of crack growth resistance in fiber reinforced ceramics is presented. The formulation of the model is based on a small scale geometry of a macrocrack with a bridging zone, the process zone, which governs the resistance mechanism. The effect of high toughness of the fibers in retardation of the crack advance, and the significance of the fiber pullout mechanism on the crack growth resistance, are reflected in this model. The model allows one to address issues such as influence of fiber spacing, fiber flexibility, and fiber matrix friction. Two approaches were used. One represents the fracture initiation and concentrated on the development of the first microcracks between fibers. An exact closed form solution was obtained for this case. The second case deals with the development of an array of microcracks between fibers forming the bridging zone. An implicit exact solution is formed for this case. In both cases, a discrete fiber distribution is incorporated into the solution

A control problem for Burgers' equation with bounded input/output

A stabilization problem for Burgers' equation is considered. Using linearization, various controllers are constructed which minimize certain weighted energy functionals. These controllers produce the desired degree of stability for the closed-loop nonlinear system. A numerical scheme for computing the feedback gain functional is developed and several numerical experiments are performed to show the theoretical results